Wednesday, November 01, 2006 05:55:37 AM
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
Illuminati: The Hidden Agenda for World Government
Griffin interview with Norman Dodd in 1982
Wednesday, November 01, 2006 05:55:37 AM
This is a very interesting video. "The man who tells
this story is none other than Mr. Norman Dodd, who
in 1954 was the staff director of the Congressional
Special Committee to Investigate Tax-exempt
Foundations, sometimes referred to as the Reece
Committee, in recognition of its chairman,
Congressman Carol Reece." He is here interviewed by
Ed Griffin back in 1982. Dodd is telling us about
his research into the tax-exempt organization and
what they REALLY stand for. He shows us that the
Carnegie Endowment, the Ford Foundation, the
Guggenheim Foundation, and the Rockefeller
Foundation joined together to alter American history
and take over the whole education system in America,
so the children can be indoctrinated into accepting
a World Government. Wes Penre,
Listen to the un-edited interview
. The transcript is printed here below:
D GRIFFIN: Welcome to The Reality
Zone. I'm Ed Griffin. The story we are about to hear represents
a missing piece in the puzzle of modern history. We are about to
hear a man tell us that the major tax-exempt foundations of
America since at least 1945 have been operating to promote a
hidden agenda, and that agenda has nothing to do with the
surface appearance of charity, good works, or philanthropy. This
man will tell you that the real objective has been to influence
American educational institutions and to control foreign policy
of the federal government. The purpose of this control has been
to condition Americans to accept the creation of world
government. That government is to be based on the principle of
collectivism, which is another way of saying socialism, and it
is to be ruled from behind the scenes by those same interests
which control the tax-exempt foundations. Is this a believable
scenario? Well, the man who tells this story is none other than
Mr. Norman Dodd, who in 1954 was the staff director of the
Congressional Special Committee to Investigate Tax-exempt
Foundations, sometimes referred to as the Reece Committee, in
recognition of its chairman, Congressman Carol Reece. The
interview we are about to hear was conducted by me in 1982. I
had no immediate use for the material at that time, but I
realized that Mr. Dodd's story was of great importance, and
since he was advanced in age and not in good health, I wanted to
capture his recollections on videotape while he was still with
us. It was a wise decision, because Mr. Dodd did pass away just
a short time afterwards. In later years there was a resurgence
of interest in Mr. Dodd's story, and we released the videotape
to the public in 1991. And so what now follows is the soundtrack
taken from the full, unedited interview, broken occasionally
only for a tape change or to omit the sound of a passing
airplane. It stands on its own as an important piece in the
puzzle of modern history.
(THE INTERVIEW FOLLOWS)
ED GRIFFIN: Mr. Dodd, let's begin this
interview with a brief statement. For the record, please tell us
who you are, what is your background and your qualifications to
speak on this subject.
NORMAN DODD: Well, Mr. Griffin, as to
who I am, I am just, as the name implies, an individual born in
New Jersey and educated in private schools, eventually in a
school called Andover in Massachusetts and then Yale university.
Running through my whole period of being brought up and growing
up, I have been an indefatigable reader. I have had one major
interest, and that was this country as I was lead to believe it
was originally founded. I entered the world of business knowing
absolutely nothing about how that world operated, and realized
that the only way to find out what that world consisted of would
be to become part of it. I then acquired some experience in the
manufacturing world and then in the world of international
communication and finally chose banking as the field I wished to
devote my life to. I was fortunate enough to secure a position
in one of the important banks in New York and lived there. I
lived through the conditions which led up to what is known as
the crash of 1929. I witnessed what was tantamount to the
collapse of the structure of the United States as a whole.
Much to my surprise, I was confronted by my superiors in
the middle of the panic in which they were immersed. I was
confronted with the question: “Norm, what do we do now?” I was
thirty at the time and I had no more right to have an answer to
that question than the man in the moon. However, I did manage to
say to my superiors: “Gentlemen, you take this experience as
proof that there's something you do not know about banking, and
you'd better go find out what that something is and act
accordingly.” Four days later I was confronted by the same
superiors with a statement to the effect that, “Norm, you go
find out.” And I really was fool enough to accept that
assignment, because it meant that you were going out to search
for something, and nobody could tell you what you were looking
for, but I felt so strongly on the subject that I consented.
I was relieved of all normal duties inside the bank and
two-and-half years later I felt that it was possible to report
back to those who had given me this assignment. And so, I
rendered such a report; and, as a result of the report I
rendered. I was told the following: “Norm, what you're saying is
we should return to sound banking,” and I said, “Yes, in
essence, that's exactly what I’m saying.” Whereupon I got my
first shock, which was a statement from them to this effect: “We
will never see sound banking in the United States again.” They
cited chapter and verse to support that statement, and what they
cited was as follows: “Since the end of world war one we have
been responsible for what they call the institutionalizing of
conflicting interests, and they are so prevalent inside this
country that they can never be resolved.”
This came to me as an extraordinary shock because the
men who made this statement were men who were deemed as the most
prominent bankers in the country. The bank of which I was a
part, which I’ve spoken of, was a Morgan bank and, coming from
men of that caliber, a statement of that kind made a tremendous
impression on me. The type of impression that it made on me was
such that I wondered if I, as an individual and what they call a
junior officer of the bank, could with the same enthusiasm
foster the progress and policies of the bank. I spent about a
year trying to think this out and came to the conclusion that I
would have to resign.
I did resign; and, as a consequence of that, had this
experience. When my letter of resignation reached the desk of
the president of the bank, he sent for me, and I came to visit
with him, and he stated to me: “Norm, I have your letter, but I
don't believe you understand what's happened in the last 10
days.” And I said, “No, Mr. Cochran, I have no idea what's
happened.” “Well,” he said, “the directors have never been able
to get your report to them out of their mind; and, as a result,
they have decided that you as an individual must begin at once
and you must reorganize this bank in keeping with your own
ideas.” He then said, “Now, can I tear up your letter?” Inasmuch
as what had been said to me was offering me, at the age of by
then 33, about as fine an opportunity for service to the country
as I could imagine, I said yes. They said they wished me to
begin at once, and I did.
Suddenly, in the span of about six weeks, I was not
permitted to do another piece of work and, every time I brought
the subject up, I was kind of patted on the back and told, “Stop
worrying about it, Norm. Pretty soon you'll be a vice president,
and you'll have quite a handsome salary and ultimately be able
to retire on a very worthwhile pension. In the meantime you can
play golf and tennis to your heart's content on weekends.” Well,
Mr. Griffin, I found I couldn't do it. I spent a year
figuratively with my feet on the desk doing nothing and I
couldn't adjust to it so I did resign and, this time, my
Then I got my second shock, which was the discovery that
the doors of every bank in the United States were closed to me,
and I never could again get a job, as it were, in the banks. I
found myself, for the first time since I graduated from college,
out of a job.
From there on I followed various branches of the
financial world, ranging from investment counsel to membership
of the stock exchange and finally ended as an adviser to a few
individuals who had capital funds to look after. In the
meantime, my major interest became very specific, which was to
endeavor by some means of getting the educational world to
actually you might say teach the subject of economics
realistically and move it away from the support of various
speculative activities that characterize our country. I have had
that interest, and you know how, as you generate a specific
interest, you find yourself gravitating toward persons with
similar interests, and ultimately I found myself in the center
of the world of dissatisfaction with the directions that this
country was headed. I found myself in contact with many
individuals who on their own had done a vast amount of studying
and research in areas, which were part of the problem.
ED GRIFFIN: At what point in your
career did you become connected with the Reece Committee?
NORMAN DODD: 1953.
ED GRIFFIN: And what was that
NORMAN DODD: That was in the capacity
of what they called Director of Research.
ED GRIFFIN: Can you tell us what the
Reece Committee was attempting to do?
NORMAN DODD: Yes, I can tell you. It
was operating and carrying out instructions embodied in a
resolution passed by the House of Representatives, which was to
investigate the activities of foundations as to whether or not
these activities could justifiably be labeled un-American
without, I might say, defining what they meant by "un-American".
That was the resolution, and the committee had then the task of
selecting a counsel, and the counsel in turn had the task of
selecting a staff, and he had to have somebody who would direct
the work of that staff, and that was what they meant by the
Director of Research.
ED GRIFFIN: What were some of the
details, the specifics that you told the Committee at that time?
NORMAN DODD: Well, Mr. Griffin, in
that report I specifically, number one, defined what, to us, was
meant by the phrase, "un-American." We defined that in our way
as being a determination to effect changes in the country by
unconstitutional means. We have plenty of constitutional
procedures, assuming we wish to effect a change in the form of
government and that sort of thing; and, therefore, any effort in
that direction which did not avail itself of the procedures
which were authorized by the Constitution could be justifiably
be called un-American. That was the start of educating them up
to that particular point. The next thing was to educate them as
to the effect on the country as a whole of the activities of
large, endowed foundations over the then-past forty years.
ED GRIFFIN: What was that effect?
NORMAN DODD: That effect was to orient
our educational system away from support of the principles
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and implemented in
the Constitution; and the task now was the orientation of
education away from these briefly stated principles and
self-evident truths. That's what had been the effect of the
wealth, which constituted the endowments of those foundations
that had been in existence over the largest portion of this span
of 50 years, and holding them responsible for this change. What
we were able to bring forward, what we uncovered, was the
determination of these large endowed foundations, through their
trustees, to actually get control over the content of American
ED GRIFFIN: There's quite a bit of
publicity given to your conversation with Rowan Gaither. Would
you please tell us who he was and what was that conversation you
had with him?
NORMAN DODD: Rowan Gaither was, at
that time, president of the Ford Foundation. Mr. Gaither had
sent for me when I found it convenient to be in New York, asked
me to call upon him at his office, which I did. Upon arrival,
after a few amenities, Mr. Gaither said: “Mr. Dodd, we've asked
you to come up here today because we thought that possibly, off
the record, you would tell us why the Congress is interested in
the activities of foundations such as ourselves?” Before I could
think of how I would reply to that statement, Mr. Gaither then
went on voluntarily and said:
“Mr. Dodd, all of us who have a hand in
the making of policies here have had experience either with
the OSS during the war or the European Economic
Administration after the war. We've had experience operating
under directives, and these directives emanate and did
emanate from the White House. Now, we still operate under
just such directives. Would you like to know what the
substance of these directives is?”
I said, “Mr. Gaither, I’d like very
much to know,” whereupon he made this statement to me: “Mr.
Dodd, we are here operate in response to similar directives, the
substance of which is that we shall use our grant-making power
so to alter life in the United States that it can be comfortably
merged with the Soviet Union.”
Well, parenthetically, Mr. Griffin, I nearly fell off
the chair. I, of course didn't, but my response to Mr. Gaither
then was: “Well, Mr. Gaither I can now answer your first
question. You've forced the Congress of the United States to
spend $150,000 to find out what you've just told me.” I said:
“Of course, legally, you're entitled to make grants for this
purpose, but I don't think you're entitled to withhold that
information from the people of the country to whom you're
indebted for your tax exemption, so why don't you tell the
people of the country what you just told me?” And his answer
was, “We would not think of doing any such thing.” So then I
said, “Well, Mr. Gaither, obviously you've forced the Congress
to spend this money in order to find out what you've just told
ED GRIFFIN: Mr. Dodd, you have spoken
before about some interesting things that were discovered by
Katherine Casey at the Carnegie Endowment. Can you tell us that
NORMAN DODD: Yes, I’d be glad to, Mr.
Griffin. This experience that you just referred to came about in
response to a letter that I had written to the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, asking certain questions and
gathering certain information. On the arrival of that letter,
Dr. Johnson, who was then president of the Carnegie Endowment,
telephoned me and said, did I ever come up to New York. I said
yes, I did more or less each weekend, and he said, “Well, when
you're next here, will you drop in and see us?” Which I did.
On arrival at the office of the endowment I found myself
in the presence of Dr. Joseph Johnson, the president – who was
the successor to Alger Hiss – two vice presidents, and their own
counsel, a partner in the firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. Dr.
Johnson said, after again amenities, Mr. Dodd, we have your
letter. We can answer all those questions, but it would be a
great deal of trouble, and we have a counter suggestion. Our
counter suggestion is: If you can spare a member of your staff
for two weeks and send that member up to New York, we will give
to that member a room in the library and the minute books of
this foundation since its inception, and we think that whatever
you want to find out or that Congress wants to find out will be
obvious from those minutes.
Well, my first reaction was they'd lost their minds. I
had a pretty good idea of what those minutes would contain, but
I realized that Dr. Johnson had only been in office two years,
and the other vice presidents were relatively young men, and
counsel seemed to be also a young man, and I guessed that
probably they'd never read the minutes themselves. So I said I
had somebody; I would accept their offer.
I went back to Washington and I selected a member of my
staff who had been a practicing attorney in Washington. She was
on my staff to see to it that I didn't break any congressional
procedures or rules, in addition to which she was unsympathetic
to the purpose of the investigation. She was level-headed and a
very reasonably brilliant, capable lady. Her attitude toward the
investigation was: What could possibly be wrong with
foundations? They do so much good.
Well, in the face of that sincere conviction of
Katherine's I went out of my way not to prejudice her in any
way, but I did explain to her that she couldn't possibly cover
50 years of written minutes in two weeks, so she would have to
do what we call spot reading. I blocked out certain periods of
time to concentrate on, and off she went to New York. She came
back at the end of two weeks with the following on dictaphone
We are now at the year 1908,
which was the year that the Carnegie Foundation began
operations. In that year, the trustees, meeting for the
first time, raised a specific question, which they discussed
throughout the balance of the year in a very learned
fashion. The question is: “Is there any means known more
effective than war, assuming you wish to alter the life of
an entire people?” And they conclude that no more effective
means than war to that end is known to humanity.
So then, in 1909, they raised the second question
and discussed it, namely: “How do we involve the United
States in a war?”
Well, I doubt at that time if there was any subject
more removed from the thinking of most of the people of this
country than its involvement in a war. There were
intermittent shows in the Balkans, but I doubt very much if
many people even knew where the Balkans were. Then, finally,
they answered that question as follows: “We must control the
State Department.” That very naturally raises the question
of how do we do that? And they answer it by saying: “We must
take over and control the diplomatic machinery of this
country.” And, finally, they resolve to aim at that as an
Then time passes, and we are eventually in a war,
which would be World War I. At that time they record on
their minutes a shocking report in which they dispatched to
President Wilson a telegram, cautioning him to see that the
war does not end too quickly.
Finally, of course, the war is over. At that time
their interest shifts over to preventing what they call a
reversion of life in the United States to what it was prior
to 1914 when World War I broke out. At that point they came
to the conclusion that, to prevent a reversion, “we must
control education in the United States.” They realize that
that's a pretty big task. It is too big for them alone, so
they approach the Rockefeller Foundation with the suggestion
that that portion of education which could be considered
domestic be handled by the Rockefeller Foundation and that
portion which is international should be handled by the
Endowment. They then decide that the key to success of these
two operations lay in the alteration of the teaching of
So they approach four of the then-most prominent
teachers of American history in the country – people like
Charles and Mary Byrd – and their suggestion to them is:
will they alter the manner in which they present their
subject? And they got turned down flat. So they then decide
that it is necessary for them to do as they say, “build our
own stable of historians.”
Then they approach the Guggenheim Foundation, which
specializes in fellowships, and say: “When we find young men
in the process of studying for doctorates in the field of
American history and we feel that they are the right
caliber, will you grant them fellowships on our say-so?” And
the answer is yes. So, under that condition, eventually they
assembled assemble twenty, and they take this twenty
potential teachers of American history to London, and there
they're briefed on what is expected of them when, as, and if
they secure appointments in keeping with the doctorates they
will have earned. That group of twenty historians ultimately
becomes the nucleus of the American Historical Association.
Toward the end of the 1920's, the Endowment grants
to the American Historical Association $400,000 for a study
of our history in a manner which points to what can this
country look forward to in the future. That culminates in a
seven-volume study, the last volume of which is, of course,
in essence a summary of the contents of the other six. The
essence of the last volume is: The future of this country
belongs to collectivism administered with characteristic
American efficiency. That's the story that ultimately grew
out of and, of course, was what could have been presented by
the members of this Congressional committee to the congress
as a whole for just exactly what it said. They never got to
ED GRIFFIN: This is the story that
emerged from the minutes of the Carnegie Endowment?
NORMAN DODD: That's right. It was
official to that extent.
ED GRIFFIN: Katherine Casey brought
all of these back in the form of dictated notes from a
verbatimreading of the minutes?
NORMAN DODD: On dictaphone belts.
ED GRIFFIN: Are those in existence
NORMAN DODD: I don't know. If they
are, they're somewhere in the Archives under the control of the
Congress, House of Representatives.
ED GRIFFIN: How many people actually
heard those, or were they typed up, a transcript made of them?
NORMAN DODD: No.
ED GRIFFIN: How many people actually
heard those recordings?
NORMAN DODD: Oh, three maybe. Myself,
my top assistant, and Katherine. I might tell you, this
experience, as far as its impact on Katherine Casey was
concerned, was she never was able to return to her law practice.
If it hadn't been for Carol Reece's ability to tuck her away
into a job in the Federal Trade Commission, I don't know what
would have happened to Katherine. Ultimately, she lost her mind
as a result of it. It was a terrible shock. It's a very rough
experience to encounter proof of these kinds.
ED GRIFFIN: Mr. Dodd can you summarize
the opposition to the Committee, the Reece Committee and
particularly the efforts to sabotaging the Committee?
NORMAN DODD: Well, they began right at
the start of the work of an operating staff, Mr. Griffin, and it
began on the day in which the Committee met for the purpose of
consenting to or confirming my appointment to the position of
Director of Research. Thanks to the abstention of the minority
members of the committee, that is, the two Democratic members,
from voting, technically I was unanimously appointed.
ED GRIFFIN: Wasn't the White House
involved in opposition?
NORMAN DODD: Not at this particular
point, sir. Mr. Reece ordered counsel and myself to visit Wayne
Hayes. Wayne Hayes was the ranking minority member of the
Committee as a Democrat, so we came to him, and I had to go down
to Mr. Hayes's office, which I did. Mr. Hayes greeted us with
the flat statement directed primarily to me, which was that “I
am opposed to this investigation. I regard it as nothing but an
effort on the part of Carol Reece to gain a little prominence,
so I'll do everything I can to see that it fails.” Well, I have
a strange personality in that a challenge of that nature
interests me. Our counsel withdrew. He went over and sat on the
couch in Mr. Reece's office and pouted, but I sort of took up
this statement of Hayes as a challenge and set myself the goal
of winning him over to our point of view. I started by noticing
on his desk that there was a book, and the book was of the type
that – there were many in these days – that would be complaining
about the spread of Communism in Hungary, that type of book.
This meant to me at least he has read a book, and so I brought
up the subject of the spread of the influence of the Soviet
world. For two hours, I discussed this with Hayes and finally
ended up with his rising from his desk and saying: “Norm, if you
will carry this investigation toward the goal as you have
outlined to me, I'll be your biggest supporter.” I said: “Mr.
Hayes, I can assure you that I will not double-cross you.”
Subsequently Mr. Hayes sent word to me that he was in
Bethesda Hospital with an attack of ulcers, but would I come and
see him, which I did. He then said: “Norm, the only reason I’ve
asked you to come out here is I just want to hear you say again
you will not double-cross me.” I gave him that assurance, and
that was the basis of our relationship. Meantime, counsel took
the attitude expressed in these words: “Norm, if you want to
waste your time with this guy,” as he called him, “you go ahead
and do it, but don't ever ask me to say anything to him under
any conditions on any subject.” So, in a sense, that created a
context for me to operate in relation to Hayes on my own. As
time passed, Hayes offered friendship, which I hesitated to
accept because of his vulgarity, and I didn't want to get mixed
up with him socially under any conditions.
Well, that was our relationship for about three months,
and then, eventually, I had occasion to add to my staff a
top-flight intelligence officer. Both the Republican National
Committee and the White House were resorted to, to stop me from
continuing this investigation in the directions Carol Reece had
personally asked me to do, which was to utilize this
investigation, Mr. Griffin, to uncover the fact that this
country had been the victim of a conspiracy. That was Mr.
Reece's conviction. I eventually agreed to carry it out. I
explained to Mr. Reece that Hayes's own counsel wouldn't go in
that direction. He gave me permission to disregard their
counsel, and I had then to set up an aspect of the investigation
outside of our office, more or less secret. The Republican
National Committee got wind of what I was doing and they did
everything they could to stop me. They appealed to counsel to
stop me, and finally they resorted to the White House.
ED GRIFFIN: Was their objection
because of what you were doing or because of the fact that you
were doing it outside of the official auspices of the Committee?
NORMAN DODD: No, their objection was,
as they put it, my devotion to what they called anti-semitism.
That was a cooked up idea. In other words, it wasn't true at
all, but anyway, that's the way they expressed it.
ED GRIFFIN: Why did they do that? How
could they say that?
NORMAN DODD: Well, they could say it,
Mr. Griffin, but they had to have something in the way of a
rationalization of their decision to do everything they could to
stop the completion of this investigation in the directions that
it was moving, which would have been an exposure of this
Carnegie Endowment story and the Ford Foundation and the
Guggenheim and the Rockefeller Foundation, all working in
harmony toward the control of education in the United States.
Well, to secure the help of the White House in the picture, they
got the White House to cause the liaison personality between the
White House and the hill, a Major Person, to go up to Hayes and
try to get him to, as it were, actively oppose what the
investigation was engaged in. Hayes very kindly then would
listen to this visit from Major Person; then he would call me
and say, “Norm, come up to my office. I have a good deal to tell
you.” I would go up. He would tell me, “I’ve just had a visit
from Major Person, and he wants me to break up this
investigation.” I then said, “Well, what did you do? What did
you say to him?” He said,” I just told him to get the hell out.”
He did that three times, and I got pretty proud of him in the
sense that he was, as it were, backing me up. We finally
embarked upon the hearing at Hayes's request, because he wanted
to get them out of the way before he went abroad for the summer.
ED GRIFFIN: Why were the hearings
finally terminated? What happened to the Committee?
NORMAN DODD: What happened to the
Committee or the hearings?
ED GRIFFIN: The hearings.
NORMAN DODD: Oh, the hearings were
terminated. Carol Reece was up against such a furor with Hayes
through the activity of our own counsel. Hayes became convinced
that he was being double-crossed and he put on a show in a
public hearing room, Mr. Griffin, that was an absolute disgrace.
He called Carol Reece publicly every name in the book, and Mr.
Reece took this as proof that he couldn't continue the hearings.
He actually invited me to accompany him when he went down to
Hayes's office and, in my presence with tears rolling down his
face, Hayes apologized to Carol Reece for what he had done and
his conduct, and apologized to me. I thought that would be
enough and that Carol would resume, but he never did.
ED GRIFFIN: The charge of
anti-semitism is intriguing. What was the basis of that charge?
Was there a basis for it at all?
NORMAN DODD: The basis of what the
Republican National Committee used was that the intelligence
officer I’d taken on my staff when I oriented this investigation
to the exposure and proof of a conspiracy was known to have a
book, and the book was deemed to be anti-semitic. This was
childish, but this was the second in command of the Republican
National Committee, and he told me I’d have to dismiss this
person from my staff.
ED GRIFFIN: Who was that person?
NORMAN DODD: A Colonel Lee Lelane.
ED GRIFFIN: And what was his book? Do
NORMAN DODD: The book they referred to
was called Waters Flowing Eastward, which was a
castigation of the Jewish influence in the world.
ED GRIFFIN: What were some of the
other charges made by Mr. Hayes against Mr. Reece?
NORMAN DODD: Just that Mr. Reece was
utilizing this investigation for his own prominence inside the
House of Representatives. That was the only charge that Hayes
could think of.
ED GRIFFIN: How would you describe the
motivation of the people who created the foundations, the big
foundations, in the very beginning? What was their motivation?
NORMAN DODD: Their motivation? Well,
let's take Mr. Carnegie as an example. He has publicly declared
that his steadfast interest was to counteract the departure of
the colonies from Great Britain. He was devoted to just putting
the pieces back together again.
ED GRIFFIN: Would that have required
the collectivism that they were dedicated to?
NORMAN DODD: No, no, no. These
policies, the foundations’ allegiance to these un-American
concepts, are all traceable to the transfer of the funds into
the hands of trustees, Mr. Griffin. It's not the men who had a
hand in the creation of the wealth that led to the endowment for
what we would call public purposes.
ED GRIFFIN: It's a subversion of the
original intent, then?
NORMAN DODD: Oh, yes, completely, and
that’s how it got into the world traditionally of bankers and
ED GRIFFIN: How do you see that the
purpose and direction of the major foundations has changed over
the years to the present? What is it today?
NORMAN DODD: Oh, it’s a hundred
percent behind meeting the cost of education such as it is
presented through the schools and colleges of the United States
on the subject of our history as proving our original ideas to
be no longer practicable. The future belongs to collectivistic
concepts, and there's just no disagreement on that.
ED GRIFFIN: Why do the foundations
generously support Communist causes in the United States?
NORMAN DODD: Well, because to them,
Communism represents a means of developing what we call a
monopoly, that is, an organization of, say, a large-scale
industry into an administerable unit.
ED GRIFFIN: Do they think that they
will be the ones to benefit?
NORMAN DODD: They will be the
beneficiaries of it, yes.
[END OF INTERVIEW]
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